India’s water blackmail

AI Summary

The article argues that India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and accelerated hydroelectric and water-diversion projects on the Chenab could increase its leverage over Pakistan. It highlights proposed storage and diversion infrastructure, including the Chenab-Beas Link Tunnel, and frames the strategy as a threat to Pakistan’s economic and foreign-policy interests.

SINCE April 2025, when India unilaterally suspended the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), most scholarship has treated it as a political decision by the BJP-led NDA government. While it is true that the BJP has been developing a narrative that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was ‘rectifying’ the ‘mistakes’ of the Nehruvian era, the decisions and developments during the past 18 months suggest that New Delhi is developing a long-term strategy to strangle Pakistan economically. India’s primary target in this strategic campaign is the Chenab river, which it is systematically converting into a long-term instrument of leverage to dictate Pakistan’s foreign policy, weaken its stance on Kashmir, and dominate bilateral relations. In the 18 months since it decided to keep the IWT in abeyance, India has aggressively leveraged this treaty vacuum to build a massive network of storage, regulation, and diversion infrastructure on the Chenab. New and accelerated hydroelectric power projects, primarily concentrated in the Chenab basin, have ballooned from a baseline capacity of 3,263 MW to 7,620.5 MW, supported by a massive financial outlay of approximately Indian rupees 414.04 billion. No single dam or diversion canal can permanently dry up a river. However, a highly synchronised, connected network of mega structures, coupled with diversion canals, can fundamentally determine who controls the timing and volume of river flow. India is trying to apply a two-pronged strategy, ie, increase storage capacity and enhance the ability to divert the Chenab’s water. India’s strategic roadmap involves five megaprojects alongside extensive local diversions. This includes Sawalkot (1,856 MW), Kirthai I & II (1,320 MW), Pakal Dul (1,000 MW), Ratle (850 MW), and Bursar Storage (800 MW). India’s infrastructure push began in May 2025, with the announcement of the tender for the Uri-II project (240 MW), followed quickly in June 2025 by the tender announcement for the Dulhasti-II project (260 MW). Activity accelerated in July 2025 with two major announcements — first, a tender for the removal of deposited sediments from the Salal Dam Reservoir, and second, the Sawalkot project (1,856 MW) tender under international competitive bidding. In March 2026, civil contracts were officially awarded for both the Uri-I stage II and Dulhasti stage-II projects, alongside the official tender announcement for the highly controversial Chenab-Beas Link Tunnel Project (Link-3). These aforementioned projects command a combined potential diversion and storage capacity of roughly 7.287 MAF. For years, New Delhi has strategically used international platforms and institutional levers to weaken Pakistan’s economic foundations. The Chenab-Beas Link Project is particularly consequential. With a reported budget of Indian rupees 23.52bn, it proposes to transfer water from the Chandra river, a major Chenab tributary, through an 8.7-kilometre tunnel into the Beas basin and onward through a 113km canal network to eastern Indian states. The proposed diversion of 1.9 MAF annually from the Chenab basin raises serious questions about compliance with Article III of the IWT. The threat of manipulation, or the Chenab’s vulnerabilities, poses a direct risk to Pakistan’s economic survival, social stability, and national security. The Chenab directly irrigates agricultural lands across more than 11 districts of central Punjab, the country’s undisputed food basket. These districts form the densest core of the famous rice-wheat cropping zone. This 11-district area accounts for about 22 to 25 per cent of Pakistan’s national food grain output. If India controls water flows during October to December or May to July, it may affect seasonal yields in this zone. In such a scenario, it could cause a direct blow of $9bn to $11bn to Pakistan’s economy. The broader impact would ripple through the national economy in several ways. Pakistan would be forced to spend billions of scarce foreign exchange reserves to import basic food commodities. Instead of generating $3.3bn to $4bn from booming rice exports, the country would face a multibillion-dollar trade deficit just trying to secure alternative grain imports. Second, any sustained restriction on, or unpredictable disruption to, these water flows would threaten the livelihoods of millions of farming households, while endangering crops and compromising national food security. Therefore, Islamabad must view India’s decision to place the IWT in abeyance as another dimension of New Delhi’s long-standing and coordinated policy of economic strangulation of Pakistan. For years, New Delhi has strategically used international platforms and institutional levers to weaken Pakistan’s economic foundations. New Delhi has been consistently trying to restrict Islamabad’s access to global capital and limit its trade capacity. A primary example is India’s aggressive lobbying within the Financial Action Task Force, where it has consistently tried to politici