EXPLAINER-Makkah pact and defence of the Kingdom

AI Summary

The Makkah alliance is advancing from political commitments toward coordinated defence cooperation, including a Riyadh secretariat and plans for rapid deployment of agreed forces and capabilities. The article says no public authorization has been given for Pakistani or Turkish forces to fight inside Yemen, while Houthi attacks and contested government advances along the Red Sea coast shape the security context.

THE Makkah alliance has moved, in less than two months, from a political declaration towards practical cooperation, though it remains a few steps short of becoming a fully operational military alliance. Its Strategic Political and Defence Committee, which met in Riyadh on Oct 5, decided “to move immediately to the practical implementation of the collective defence commitments”. The operative part of the decision, however, is narrower than some of the headlines it has generated. The three countries agreed to “take the necessary measures to provide the agreed military forces and capabilities and ensure their rapid deployment in the Kingdom, in accordance with the approved arrangements and the national legislation of the Parties”. The Saudi urgency to see the alliance working is understandable. Through September and into early October, Yemen’s Ansar Allah group, commonly known as the Houthis, fired missiles and drones towards southern Saudi cities and energy facilities, with Riyadh saying the attacks also targeted the holy cities. One such strike hit a power station in Madina supplying Masjid-i-Nabvi. Progress so far includes political commitment, the appointment of an institutional head and formation of the Riyadh secretariat No public authorisation yet for Pakistani or Turkish forces to participate in combat inside Yemen; Turkiye only providing defensive and technical support so far At the same time, the Aden-based Presidential Leadership Council announced a counteroffensive to reverse Ansar Allah gains along the Red Sea coast. Government forces, backed by coalition air support, claimed to have recaptured Mocha and positions near Bab al Mandeb, although those claims remain contested. The Riyadh meeting and developments in Yemen came within a day of each other and are politically linked, even if they are not demonstrably part of the same operational plan. The committee’s statement, importantly, made no reference to Mocha, Bab al Mandeb or operations inside Yemen, and did not name the Houthis. The alliance has nevertheless covered considerable ground since its inception on Aug 7. An inaugural summit was followed by a meeting of the Strategic and Political Committee in Istanbul at the end of August. On Sept 25, the three countries’ military chiefs met in Riyadh and agreed to pursue intelligence sharing, military coordination and capability integration, though they made no mention of a joint command. On the sidelines, Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces and Chief of Army Staff Field Marshal Asim Munir and Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman also discussed continuing “joint efforts” against attacks on the Kingdom. The Oct 5 meeting took the next institutional steps, endorsing retired Lt Gen Nauman Mahmood as the alliance’s first secretary general, placing the Riyadh-based secretariat under his charge and authorising the rapid deployment of military forces and capabilities already “agreed”. The progress so far includes a political commitment, an institutional head and secretariat, two committee meetings, a meeting of military chiefs and a decision to begin implementation. What remains missing is a standing assigned force, a joint commander, publicly defined rules of engagement and a published military doctrine. There is also no public authorisation for Pakistani or Turkish forces to participate in combat operations inside Yemen. In fact, Turkish officials told Reuters on Wednesday that Ankara was “sending mainly defensive and technical support to Saudi Arabia to help it fight the Houthis, adding that the support expected from Turkiye was only in the form of military equipment, intelligence sharing, and weapons systems, and that no other form of deployment had taken place as part of the alliance so far. Between the lines Understanding the alliance requires answers to basic questions that remain unresolved as to what constitutes a threat or an attack, against whom has the alliance been formed, what would trigger a response, and who would decide on action and through which command structure? In the absence of a published charter and doctrine, its working principles have to be pieced together from the August agreement, subsequent government statements and the Oct 5 decision. The threat, in the language used by the parties, is an armed attack on a member’s security, sovereignty or territorial integrity, with particular emphasis on protecting Makkah and Madinah. There is, however, no public definition covering attacks on forces, ships, diplomatic missions or personnel outside national territory. The Houthis are impliedly identified as the attackers, while Iran is widely seen as their enabling power, but neither is named in the agreement. Collective deterrence appears to mean making the commitment credible through military readiness, coordination and the ability to respond. No punishment strategy has been published, while a response seems contingent on a request from the country under threat, agreement on